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CIVILIZATIONAL SOCIOLOGY AND
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ATLANTIC
Jeremy Smith
This paper calls for an opening of dialogue on the historical character of the Atlantic world
between two fields. To date, historical sociologists researching the significance of inter-
civilizational encounters have not paid a great deal of attention to the case of the Americas.
While historical and comparative sociology has assimilated the lessons of post-colonial critique,
the startling histories of transatlantic colonialism have not had the impact on studies of
civilizations carried out in this field that they should have. When it comes to the second field,
Atlantic Studies, the paper argues that sociologists working in the first field have something to
offer in their re-theorization of the character of long term inter-civilizational contacts. A fresh
approach to the study of civilizations is sketched out here that reconstructs theoretical
conclusions drawn in historical sociology in a way that will be of interest to specialists in
Atlantic Studies. The first part of the paper examines the historical sociology of civilizations and
sets out a new framework that revolves around a re-conception of radical difference and
Otherness. In the second section, I explore how dimensions of the historical experience of
transatlantic colonialism-such as mapping, place-naming and early ethnological curiosity-
constituted the Americas as a vital zone of the growing sense ofcivilizational superiority amongst
Europeans between the 76th and 78th centuries. In this section, the article argues that
civilizational sociology would profit from a systematic examination of this crucial historical
zone. The conclusion puts out a call for further detailed inter-disciplinary research that combines
the best insights of both the fields of Atlantic Studies and civilizational sociology.
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Introduction: Civilizational Sociology Reviewed
Within social theory and comparative social science, there is a rising interest in a
type of scholarship that styles itself as 'civilizational sociology'.' This relatively new genus
of sociologists takes broad, multi-societal historical formations as its unit of analysis. Its
existing and potential appeal to comparativists, inter-culturalists and area-studies scholars
is its very object of research: the encounters between the major historical empires that
have been best remembered and most documented by historians. It invites a more far-
reaching examination of flows of goods, ideas, people, armies and beliefs. The intensity
1 Two journals have sought to capture the conceptual sea change in comparative sociology
about civilizational theory. See International Sociology 16, no. 3 (2001) and Thesis Eleven 62
(2000). Each issue is dedicated to the theme of civilizations and draws together a number of
perspectives.
and types of contact between historical societies come into focus, even where different
societies regard each other with great hostility. Against Samuel Huntington, the best
scholarship of civilizational sociology reveals that civilizations rarely 'clash' pure and
simple, but are deeply embedded in a variety of external relationships that only sometimes
involve conflict? In a broader sense, the relationships are historical, are ongoing, and
compel internal change. Post-functionalist comparative perspectives, as practiced by S. N.
Eisenstadt, Johann P. Amason and Benjamin Nelson, for example, are based on a premise
that human societies of the past were interactive and porous more than they were closed,
defensive or isolated. Their work points to the conclusion that the level of inter-cultural
contact from the High Middle Ages to the early modern era between the major
civilizational centers of Western Europe, the Islamic empires, Eurasia, China, India and
Japan is still underestimated. It is the major contention of this article that this field of
research has a good deal to offer Atlantic Studies and that, in turn, it also has much to
learn from a systematic study of the Atlantic zone, which it has thus far paid little attention
to. To this point, there has not been a significant level of dialogue between the two fields.
This article constitutes a plea for inter-disciplinary redress of this lacuna in both areas.
The starting point must be a clarification of terminology and some remarks on the
politics of the terms used. 'Civilizational' is employed as an adjective to denote cultural
features of multi-societal forms. In the current work, it is applied to Western European,
Mesoamerican and Amerindian cases. The idea of 'civilization', and indeed the very word
itself, needs clarification and its use involves distinctive risks. Civilization is referred to in
two ways. First, it alludes to historical formations, such as the ones mentioned in this
article. In this usage, it is plural and does not automatically connote a sense of cultural or
race-based pre-eminence. Second, it is taken as a historical artifact of European conceptual
thinking that coalesced in the 18th and 19th centuries. This is 'civilization' in the singular
and it evokes cultural primacy. As a historical concept, the term has been subject to
comprehensive post-colonial critique. The risk in re-utilizing it must be stated if the pitfalls
so amply highlighted in post-colonial criticism are to be avoided. It involves the danger of
uncritically and unreflectively taking on the language of civilization, which brings with it a
legacy of self-belief in Western superiority. This is a heritage internal to the very notion of
civilization and is evident from an etymological study of the word.3 The salient point to
emphasize is that the recognition of 'civilization' as a notion inherited from the era of
European imperial domination must be the premise of the kind of revision of thinking
suggested in the scholarship of civilizational sociology. In other words, dealing with the
historical and conceptual baggage of the word is part of rescuing the idea from its own
heritage for a wider purpose in comparative and historical study. Studying civilizations
sociologically today therefore involves problematizing the conceptual background of the
human sciences associated with it.
The overall argument here thus aims to establish a framework for exploring the
general interactivity of civilizations and of how circum-Atlantic encounters sharpened
European self-awareness. I start by briefly canvassing existing sociological approaches to
the study of other civilizations to set out the contours of the field. The study then moves
to launch a distinct theoretical basis for examining civilizational consciousness in the
Atlantic zone. The last section of the paper outlines how this theoretical framework could
2 His program is set out, mainly, in Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations.
3 See the editors' introductory essay in Rundell and Mennell, Classical Readings.
be applied to the historical experience of transatlantic colonialism. There is a focus on
mapping, place naming, and the early tradition of ethnological thinking.
Civilizational sociology reveals that past perceptions of civilizations in the human
sciences can be split into two classes: those who define it in the singular as the attainment
of a standard of economic, political, and moral development and those who can perceive
and conceptualize many different forms of cultural, religious, and political order.4 Three
further analytical clusters of civilizations can be identified. One approach organizes on the
plane of world histories and casts the major religious and philosophical breakthroughs of
Antiquity as the great cultural watersheds of many civilizations. The vital development that
is sought is the point at which secular and sacred authority became separate entities. This
is labeled as the 'Axial transformation' and it refers to changing metaphysical conceptions
of the world order that occurred between 500 BC and the first century of the Christian era.
The premises established during these formative periods of ontological re-conceptualiza-
tion of the world became entrenched in the dominant ideologies of leading elites.
Notwithstanding their revision over time, remain the cultural premises of identifiable
civilizations. A second approach is exemplified by sociological studies of the so-called
civilizing process that follow Norbert Elias' pioneering work. They often treat civilization in
the singular as a long-term historical process, even when a number of civilizations are
under consideration. A third class of sociology defines and studies civilizations as cultural
formations that unify otherwise diverse groups of societies around sacred and religious
premises. From this class, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Johann Amason are
discussed.
Some detail from each class can serve to establish where the sociology of
civilizations stands. Shmuel Eisenstadt and Benjamin Nelson represent the strongest
advocates of the first understanding of civilization. In Eisenstadt's view, civilizations are
forged out of what he characterizes as Axial advances, or, in other words, the
transformation of religious and philosophical principles that makes possible self-conscious
reflection on the nature of the social order.s It is around the tension between
transcendental visions and worldly experience that civilizational identity crystallized in
Antiquity. The historic period in which this transformation came through for Europe is
thought to be the flowering of Greek schools in the fifth to the third centuries BC, where
the authority and legitimacy of inherited tradition was challenged. It rendered all spheres
of social life questionable including law, politics, and philosophy. This achievement of
Hellenic Antiquity, rather than anything today, might be recognized as pan-European.
Given the diffusion of the legacy of this rich culture throughout the Islamic world, the Axial
breakthrough might be better seen as a development at the crossroads of different
societies. It was a watershed in world-historical terms and its later revival was vital to the
European trajectory.
Elsewhere, Eisenstadt posits the leap into the modern world and the leading role of
the West in it. Europe's decisive advantage lay in the institutional constellation of its social
and political structures and the competition of elites that it contained.6 The modern world
4 Johann P. Amason, "Social Theory and the Concept of Civilisation", 87 -8.
S Eisenstadt's original outline of the notion of axial transformation remains the most
far-reaching. See Esisenstadt, The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations.
6 Eisenstadt, European Civilization in a Comparative Perspective.
originated in this Europe and it constituted a civilization in its own right? The "civilization
of modernity" was, or it is, distinguished by its ideological foresight. Its rationalism in
science, law, and philosophy gave its culture critical depth and echoed the problematiza-
tion of the mundane order that had been established in Ancient Greece. Industrial and
capitalist economic development made Europe a civilizational powerhouse. Its autono-
mous figuration of power provided a worldwide model of state formation that privileged
multi-polar, smaller state units. For Eisenstadt, this compendium of achievements
exemplified the modern world, a radical realignment of cultural orientation that reaffirmed
the ideals of Greece, but that also went a good deal further. Modern civilization then
spread to the rest of the world in a confrontation with other civilizational forms during the
period under discussion here.
Benjamin Nelson also sees Axial breakthroughs as the pivotal moment in the life of a
civilization.s In his terms, civilization is a "frame of reference" forged at the intersections of
cultures and from productive internal conflicts. This frame can incorporate many societies
and it is marked off from other sociological categories (like the notion of "society" itself) by
its application of broad "paradigmatic cultural patterns", a definition consistent with other
thinkers considered here. As with Eisenstadt, Nelson follows Karl Jaspers' parent notion of
Axial transformation of the "structures of consciousness". The mOst prominent type of
structure is Europe's rational consciousness and, in Benjamin Nelson's view, the critical
period is the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.9 It was during this period that "the new
logic and the new dialectic" began to alter the relationship between faith and knowledge.
The thirteenth century was, therefore, a renaissance of critical inquiry into the world, one
in which rationalistic philosophy enjoyed a good reputation in Christian Europe. This is the
most decisive and comprehensive development on the road to rationalist consciousness. It
is a breakthrough either ignored or understated elsewhere and it serves to highlight the
neglect of monasticism as an early incubator of rationalism. In this way, Benjamin dates
Europe's decisive cultural shift earlier. The difficult and uneven emergence of science has a
longer history that can be rooted in monastic and clerical developments. Modern Europe
had its origins in the rationalization of thought for Benjamin and this produces an
explanation of Axial developments quite different from Eisenstadt's. Consequently, it
produces another chronology also.
No discussion of sociological conceptions of civilization is adequate without a
reference to Norbert Elias. lO For Elias, seismic shifts in culture are only properly understood
in relation to economic developments, urbanization, the modification of behavior and,
above all, the emergence of centralized states in Europe from the sixteenth century
onwards. His notion of the civilizing process combined historical investigation of codes of
conduct and self-restraint with explanations of the figuration of power, the rise of the
money economy and urbanization. The taming of warrior behavior and the refinement of
manners were evidence of a civilizing process whose impulses reach back beyond the
Renaissance. With the rise of the absolutist court society, a civilized ethos of life became
intimately connected with a transformation of the figuration of power. Centralization of
7 Eisenstadt, Patterns of Modernity. See especially the opening introduction.
S Nelson's views are well collated and explored in Huff, On the Roads to Modernity.
9 Huff, On the Roads to Modernity, 'Preface'.
10 See Elias' landmark sociology of state formation, State Formation and Civilization.
the instruments of rule and the refinement of courtly conduct went hand-in-hand as co-
determining processes and they were impelled by economic and urban development.
Elias understands civilization as the self-pacification of warrior conduct. "Civilized"
denotes a singular normative standard of manners, language, intercourse, and custom and
is expressed in the 16th century notion of civilite, the means by which courtiers
distinguished themselves from their rough forebears and barbaric outsiders. Debates
within the bourgeois intelligentsia in France and Germany captured the logics in play and
helped to shape new standards. In this sense, Elias' theory of the civilizing process revolves
around the manifestations of a normatively distinct mode of behavior and self-constrained
conduct along with their corollary, the consolidation of territorial power. As he sees it, this
was a matter of a self-consciousness of civilized standards on the part of early modern
court elites.
Courtly self-constraint and allied forms of rationality are evident in other civiliza-
tionaI centers, but this is scarcely acknowledged. In one crucial respect, Elias' sociology
neglects the impact of societies to Europe's east. Civilizing processes in other societies may
be greatly developed, but the manner in which regular inter-civilizational contact induces
norms of social constraint is conspicuously absent from his sociology of manners. In this
regard, Elias takes civilization in the singular. The European acculturation of standards of
civilized conduct that resulted from the encounter with America is not admitted into his
historical sociology and cannot be without the expansion of the scope of analysis to
encompass inter-civilizational encounters. Encounters in the American hemisphere must
have had consequences in ways that are difficult to untangle in Elias' framework of
endogenous movements. Instead, colonialism appears as a one-way process in which
Europeans' normative standards are imperfectly disseminated, while the influence of
images and interpretations of America on the temperament of behavior attract little
comment. Elias' chief insight into civilization as self-consciousness unfortunately fades at
the critical stage. His work is, therefore, a point of departure in this essay's re-conception
of civilization.
The analyses of Elias, Nelson, and Eisenstadt are premised on the assumption that
states and empires have a civilizational aspect to them, but do not represent an entire
civilizational mass. However, for the conflicts and encounters associated with colonialism
(especially in the forms that it took in the Atlantic world) to be seen as, in part,
civilizational, the category of civilization itself needs to be further refined. It does not solely
denote an Axial breakthrough (or series of them) or a process of civilizing the norms of
conduct and the consolidation of power. For the purposes of the argument in this article,
it is better understood as a sort of consciousness actualized in a variety of social practices
that distinguishes broad multi-societal formations. The third class of civilizational
sociologists identified above has made valuable contributions towards this kind of
comparative sociological understanding. Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss can be put
together as they experienced a confluence of ideas that produced an original synthesis,
which echoes in contemporary civilizations sociology.ll Durkheim's early sociology
stressed the functional division of labor in self-contained national societies. His later
turn to anthropology was a move to a plane of cultural comparison. The border-bounded
society was problematized as a unit of analysis, as was a notion of civilization that
11 Durkheim and Mauss, "In Between Sociology and Anthropology". See, Rundell and Mennell,
Classical Readings.
privileged the unity of societies in symbolic representations.12 This met Mauss' own
anthropological insights that concentrated on the cultural fabric that tied societies in a
civilizational zone.
Durkheim and Mauss, therefore, generated two notions of civilization. First,
civilization is a cultural form subject to "rationalization," that is to national appropriation
or modification by states. However, it cannot be completely confined to any particular
state. So stateless societies can be attributed a cultural unity-of-sorts, a move supported to
some degree by ethnographies of their day. This implies that civilization can only be
understood in the plural, as delineable cultural unities.
Second, the attention paid to the symbolic dimension in their neglected writings
paved the way for a notion of civilization that did not bind itself to the project of
nationalism of anyone state and indeed is open to further non-Eurocentric elaboration. To
Durkheim, this was a conscience collective, or a fabric of taboos, representations, and
symbols that sacralized meaning across pre-industrial societies. Generally, it implied that
the proper domain for the study of civilization is not manners or the emblems of progress
so much as the symbolic realm in which social intercourse is made meaningful.
Max Weber's contribution to sociology remains relevant today, but the significance
is complicated and sometimes marred. For Amason, Weber produces results that isolate
cultural zones for analysis, even though there is little of a pre-existing conceptual
framework to maximize the potential conclusions.13 Weber identifies "cultural areas" and
"centers," but does not elucidate original theoretical principles for the distinctions that he
makes. The European center is analyzed extensively, especially in The Protestant Ethic.
However, China, India, Japan, and other centers of the Oriental zone are not treated
conclusively and so comparative insights are only preliminary. Culture is read through the
sociologies of religion and rationality, which constrain the breadth of conclusions that
could be drawn. These are the threads of a framework that Amason more properly calls
post-Weberianism. The prelude to this is a re-conceptualization of the inter-linkage of
"culture" and "power" in which neither is seen as inert and both are mutually modifying.
Instead of "power" and "culture" appearing as juxtaposed "things," both can be seen as
varying across history and across different civilizational bases. If this is so, then there seems
to be little reason to view civilizations as sealed, and not dynamic and self-transforming,
formations that were more-or-less remote from each other until the modern age. I argue
elsewhere that this is a basis for some interesting comparisons with Eisenstadt's work.14
There is a conceptual reworking of Weberian schools of thought between them that clears
the ground for a comparative sociology that can stress inter-civilizational contact and
exchange over the longue duree instead of isolation.
The third class of theorists offers the most salient historical understanding of inter-
civilizational relations. The potent image to draw from this current is one of civilizations as
geo-cultural constellations of discrete societies that embody unity-in-tension. This means
that civilizations have been harmonized by an overarching cultural imagery, but have also
been demographically, ethnically, and economically diverse. Many historians researching
12 Rundell and Mennell, Classical Readings, see especially 20-1.
13 Arnason, Social Theory, 58-60.
14 Little comparison of Eisenstadt and Arnason is available in the literature and yet their own
exchanges, affinities, and debated differences beg further analysis. See Smith, "Theories of State
Formation", 225 - 51.
in the vein of civilizations analysis have demonstrated that such clusters often encompass
a rich diversity of peoples, migratory movements, beliefs, and styles. Historical civilizations
are therefore better seen as open to internal alterations prompted by contact with other
societies and geo-cultures. What brings them together, according to the view that I am
expounding here, is a civilizational imaginary that enables inter-cultural connections.
Ethnic, economic, political, or even linguistic homogeneity is not a requisite pre-condition
for coherent civilizational perception to exist and often heterogeneity has prevailed.
The Civilizational Imaginary
My main theoretical proposition around the civilizational imaginary is laid out in two
contentions. First, civilizational consciousness is symbolic and signifies social institutions,
customs, and practices that situate the ontological boundaries of difference and identity.
Second, following Cornelius Castoriadis, civilizational consciousness rests on an inherited
and emergent imaginary. Castoriadis and others articulate a version of the imaginary that is
distinguished from others' (including Jacques Lacan's) by its focus on abstract social
significations; that is the image making that takes place as a necessity in all societies:
(E)very society defines and develops an image ofthe natural world, ofthe universe in which
it lives, attempting in every instance to make of it a signifying whole, in which a place has to
be made not only for the natural objects and beings important for the life of the collectivity,
but also for the collectivity itself, establishing, finally, a certain 'world order,.15
This conception of the imaginary stresses the human source of these images,
symbols, language, myths, rules, conflicts, and structures. Without these forms, human
existence would be chaotic and without system.16 They also incorporate components of
civilizational identity, as they establish the symbolic borders by which social actors
constitute difference meaningfully. Forms of knowledge, manners, sacred belief, and
behaviors are rendered recognizable, or are alternatively obscured, in inter-civilizational
encounters by the degree of commensurability of imaginary significations. In other words,
the capacity for inter-civilizational exchange is guided by the extent of mutual
comprehension of symbolic forms. The civilizational imaginary also demarcates the
parameters in which an awareness of comparative cultural coherence can emerge.
To this first understanding of the civilizational imaginary, I must add the second
contention. The imaginary is comprised of traditions and the scope for internal
transformation. Two elements of Castoriadis' theory of the social imaginary give some
purchase on the process of change that occurs in the crucible of civilizational contacts and
engagement. These two elements are, in Castoriadis' words, the "instituted" and
"instituting" imaginary:
On the one hand, it is given structures, "materialized" institutions and works, whether
these be material or not; and, on the other hand, that which structures, institutes,
materializes. In short, it is the union and the tension of instituting society and of
instituted society, of history made and of history in the making.1?
15 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, 149.
16 Castoriadis, "Radical Imagination", 136-54.
1? Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, 108.
Arnason retheorizes this as "creative transformation.,,18 His rendition amplifies
Castoriadis' original notion through the presumption that all social formations primarily,
though variously, rest on inherited structures and visions. Where Castoriadis places the
accent on the novelty of world-historical cultural breakthroughs, for Arnason the weight of
tradition falls more heavily on the makers of history. The implication of this view is that the
inventiveness of cultural breakthrough is exaggerated by Castoriadis and that ideas always
depend upon given traditions in acts of radical reinterpretation. However, the weight of
inherited traditions is not conceived of as an unshakeable burden. Historical agents are
engaged in processes of creative change. Amason's reconsideration minimizes some of
Castoriadis' formulations, while accentuating others. This is a helpful reformulation in which
social and cultural change is conceptualized in terms of existing structures and traditions
derived from the past, whilst accounting for creative agency mobilized in the present.
Arnason makes an important assumption relevant to this discussion of the
civilizational imaginary. In the formation, growth and renovation of societies, creation,
and reproduction are always inter-related. The central image becomes one of collective
arrangement and reorganization based on an inherited order and a creative horizon.
Implicit in this conclusion is the assumption that societies are anything but closed entities.
The societies that interact within a civilizational cluster or with other civilizational forms are
dynamic combinations of traditions and change.
This insight at the heart of Arnason's reworking of Castoriadis enables a more
flexible and open-ended historical sociology of particular cases of inter-civilizational
exchange and collision. The instituted and instituting imaginary, reformulated by Arnason
as creative transformation, can be recast as existing civilizational traditions combined
dynamically with emergent signs that materialize during the course of interaction with
other civilizational forms. The civilizational imaginary can now be considered an amalgam
of inherited and instituting signs that animate social meaning in a way that guides
responses to encounters with wholly different societies, social formations, and peoples.
Understood in this way, civilizational consciousness involves ideas derived from an
imaginary that is mainly an assembly of signs that lends general meaning to events. It
becomes a set of symbolic standards by which others could be judged in terms of societal,
economic, and political development. In turn, this sets the parameters of engagement.
In Western Europe's early modern period, the animation of meaning in Atlantic
encounters stimulated a sharpening of civilizational awareness, or a consciousness of
cultural specificity. This consciousness can be gauged in the growing comprehension of
cultural juxtaposition of the societies of Western Europe and those of the Amerindian,
Mesoamerican, and West African worlds. The second part of this essay involves a
substantive application of this outline of a theory of the civilizational imaginary. Between
the 16th and 18th centuries, the confrontation with the unfamiliar American world
interrupted and transformed European views. A fluid consciousness was expanded in the
momentous ferment of interaction with the Americas. The early centuries of transatlantic
engagements generated a self-ordering image of civilization for Westerners that drew
on both established traditions and newly forming impressions of an unfolding Atlantic
world.
18 Amason, "Culture and Imaginary Significations," 38-44.
The Atlantic as a Civilizational Zone
Civilizational sociology has not as yet come up with an in-depth study of the Atlantic
theatre. The argument here seeks to address this hiatus by developing a notion of
civilizational imaginary that might be of interest to both Atlantic scholars and historical
sociologists. To put this in more specific terms, Europeans in their encounters in the
Americas invoked imaginary traditions of Rome and of conquest (an instituted imaginary)
and materializing signs of civilization (an instituting imaginary). The remainder of this essay
treats each civilizational imaginary and the consciousness derived from it in turn.
Traditions of Expansion: Rome and Conquest
The conquest of America had historical precedents that served as a paradigm for its
execution. Above all, an enduring image of Rome served as a great tradition of Empire. Its
legacy included the notion of Universal Monarchy. Its association with the Kingdom of
Christendom receded. What Rome signified varied from one state to another.19 The
Portuguese believed themselves the heirs of Rome, due to the size of their empire and the
excellence of their sciences. The French incorporated Roman art into sixteenth century
ceremony and legal codes into juristic theory. In turn, Roman legal principles supported
the claims of lawyers that the French monarch was imperator in regno suo. The English
monarchy exercised a different and more wide-ranging relationship to the legacy of
imperium left by Rome. For example, English possession in North America was legitimated
by reference to the literary classics. Spain fervently claimed to inherit the entire legacy of
Rome, viz. the custodianship of Christendom. This claim and the rigor of its pursuit, in turn,
led Spain to a firmer embrace of the project of a universal monarchy. All built empires in
the image of Rome as that image was variously projected. All laid claim to the universality
of their sovereignty over land and sea based on Roman ancestry.
This was a background for the four main imperial states that colonized the Americas.
In addition to the potent interpretations of Greco-Roman traditions, there are further
sources of inspiration. Three traditions of conquest are under consideration here: medieval
crusading colonization, the reconquista and England's incursions into Ireland. Each is
detailed below.
The expansion of Christendom brought Europe's warrior cavalries together in
common ventures?O This was more than just a forward movement. Latin Europe looked to
the Baltic, the East Mediterranean, Jerusalem, and the south of the Iberian Peninsula for
territorial and ecclesiastical expansion. Territory formally under control was consolidated
with the decree of new lordships, towns and the organization of further bishoprics. There
is ample evidence of an "expansionary mentality" (Bartlett, 90-6) that emerged from the
system of colonization in new laws drafted and the literature and poetry that emerged.
Latin Europe therefore had methods of internal colonialism that could be used in the
Americas. It combined the seizure of land with the creation of ecclesiastical missions and
chartered townships and administration. One symbolic element was retained in the
advance into the Atlantic, even though this quickly became anachronistic after the 16th
19 See, in particular, Armitage, The Ideological Origins, 29-36, Patricia Seed, "Conclusion: The
Habits of History" in Seed, Ceremonies of Possession and Pagden, Lords of All the World, ch. 1
and 2.
20 Bartlett, The Making of Europe, 250-68.
century. Spain's sovereign claim to "universal monarchy" was blessed by the Vatican. Papal
sanction lent legitimacy to the seizure of the newly found islands in the Caribbean basin. It
was a valuable gesture for the Spanish as it demarcated new international lines of control,
even though they did not prove durable. It also represented a resolution of the tension
between the legitimation of rule and existing jurisdiction in the Americas that was
preferred by the high apparatus of the Spanish state, as opposed to Cortes' image of a
dominion of New Spain?' It provided continuity with the established and respected
approach to colonization. This was vital as the new situation brought about by Columbus'
voyage called for oceanic, rather than strictly territorial, expansion?2 The wider late
medieval growth of Christendom provided a necessary backdrop to the conquista.
The Spanish edifice has been described as an empire that founded and continued its
own specific tradition of conquest.23 Spanish colonization was an inter-continental re-run
of the late 15th century conquista that unified the peninsula under the Catholic monarchs.
The original invasion of the Islamic south of the peninsular was not a sudden movement,
but occurred between the 11th and 13th centuries. A method of conquest took shape
during the long campaigns in the Iberian south. Successful expulsion or conversion of
Jews and Muslims established a religious despoblado. Hispanic Christians then colonized
the southern frontier. Many Islamic forms and rituals of warfare and conquest were
appropriated by the conquerors and combined with Castilian traits. The result was a
hybrid mode of conquest that had no immediate equivalent in Christian traditions of
warfare?4 It was deployed in the Americas involving features that were Islamic in origin. At
its heart was a most ritualized and elaborate protocol of conquest, the requerimiento. It
was a "summons" to accept submission to a superior religion. Like the Arabic jihad, it did
not require belief, only obedience. Thus, its style of proselytism affirmed a debt to Islam.
Exposure to the Moors' conduct of war over time led to direct assimilation of its key
elements into what became a Hispanic tradition.
The zealotry that had led to the reconquista in Spain was the triumph of Isabella's
pre-union reign. Spain purged of heresy bred a martial mood. It established the monarchy
as a leading power within and outside of Spain. While the four states all shared the
impulse that led beyond the bounds of the old world, the Spanish conquest was distinct in
its reach and vigor. Its uninhibited drive spread the sphere of Spanish possession from the
Antilles on to the continent, to the south and deeper into the hinterland. The long
historical experience of conquest imbued the conquerors with a specific outlook on
wealth, land, and subjugated peoples. The singular tenacity of the Conquest did
distinguish it in the sixteenth century from tentative English and French advances. The
enthusiasm for conquest stands out, notwithstanding important clerical reactions against
its excesses.
The third paradigm of conquest is English colonization of Ireland. This is
controversial and debate continues amongst historians?5 Questions remain about
whether Ireland really was a colony and, if so, whether there was continuity between
21 Frankl, "Imperio Particular", 139-62.
22 Mancke, "Early Modern Expansion", 225 -37.
23 Lang, Conquest and Commerce, chapter one and McAlister, Spain and Portugal.
24 See Patricia Seed, "The Requirement: A Protocol for Conquest" in Ceremonies of Possession.
25 Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest; Ellis, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors; Morgan, "Mid-Atlantic
Blues", 50-5.
the colonization in Ireland and northeast America. The first question is beyond this paper,
as is most of the debate. If judgment of Ireland as a kingdom or a colony is not conclusive,
then a question mark also hangs over parallels drawn with early Anglo-American colonies
and this raises doubts about whether Irish plantation was a colonizing tradition.
David Quinn and others have argued the strong version of the case that there was
continuity?6 On their evidence, the parallel is a direct association. Some of English
America's most important adventurers were also Irelands. Their experiences may not have
traveled with them as enduring models, but there can be little doubt that their past
exploits influenced their direction in settling America. A less direct relationship is
suggested elsewhere?7 The Atlantic zone involved England in different colonial relation-
ships each of which shaped an imperial mindset in distinct but comparable ways. Ireland
was a "near periphery," while America constituted an "outer periphery." The Atlantic zone
provided examples of diverse efforts to transform strange environments and those that
inhabited them. Near and outer peripheries were zones of learning for English colonizers
whose own doctrines were tested and altered as a result. Moreover, Ireland became a
conduit in the British Atlantic. From the late 17th century, there was a sharp increase in the
rate of transoceanic migration. At the same time, Irish ports began to service growing
demand in British trade. Ireland's strategic location in the commerce with the West Indies,
Virginia and the Amazonian coast, in combination with the greater flow of people into
America, induced an Atlantic orientation.
There are other criticisms that bear on the question of models of colonizing briefly
summarized here. The absence of intention to colonize Ireland raises questions about the
idea of a "model" of colonialism implicit in the Quinn-Canny approach. While plantation
settlements were experimented with in Ulster and Munster, they were not finished forms
in any sense and were not transferable to an uncharted environment. Moreover, they
encountered a very different reaction. The military strategy of Gaelic warlords in response
to English encroachments transformed the Irish situation in fundamental respects; so
much so, that comparison with the American colonies becomes untenable. Attitudes to
the rebellious Irish may have informed subsequent dispositions to America's indigenes.
However, both had more potent precedents to draw upon in the Romanesque
juxtaposition of barbarianism, the ordered organization of urban life, and in Anglo-
Norman traditions of conquest.
Evaluating these criticisms leads to one conclusion: the relationship to Ireland
constituted a minor and fresh tradition in the English expansion into the Atlantic. Balanced
comparison of the two theatres of colonial enterprise brings out the distinctions more
than urging the similarities. Ireland resembled a realm of a composite monarchy far more
closely than English America could?8 England's promotional materials cast an optimistic
view over the opportunities there, while views of Ireland were shadowed by anxieties
about civility's movable frontiers. Its proximity set it apart from America, even though it
was also part of the greater English Atlantic. In addition, planting in English America was
carried out in a land in which there were no precedents. Coexisting plantations in Ireland
26 Canny, Kingdom and Colony; Quinn, "Ireland and Sixteenth Century European Expansion"
and Ireland and America .
27 See Jane Ohlmeyer's alternative perspective in "Seventeenth Century Ireland", 446-62.
28 See Bottigheimer, "Ireland in the Westward Enterprise," 55 -7, 60-1.
were points of comparison, but North America was, at the time, a barely reconnoitered
proposition, while the Irish frontier was more familiar.
Such points about the English experience in northern America are relevant also for
the Spanish, Portuguese, and French cases. European colonization of the Americas
involved the conquest of land, peoples, and radically different and unfamiliar social
formations. Instead of simply engaging and trading with contrasting societies, different
economic networks and familiar civilizational powers, European states inaugurated large-
scale settler-colonialism as a form of empire building and in doing so they invoked their
interpretations of ancient and conquering traditions. These buttressed a crystallizing
civilizational identity that could define itself against the opposite of America. This
encounter with American Others was not confined to meeting new peoples. It
encompassed a number of areas of cultural experience that were part of a transforming
horizon of an instituting civilizational imaginary.
Signs of Civilization
Europe's invasion and conquest of the Americas did not just involve the mobilization
of its existing traditions. The growth of the Euro-Atlantic empires stimulated a conception
of civilizational specificity. Europeans ascribed norms of civility to their own advancement
in order to establish a symbolic distance from the civilizational orders that they
encountered. The breadth of European possession circumscribed the contours of
civilizational thinking for supporters of colonial purpose, such as Sepulveda, Hakluyt,
Bodin, and Acosta, and its mildest and most trenchant critics, from Las Casas to Montaigne
and Charles Davenant. Civilizational consciousness had not crystallized in the sixteenth
century in the way that it would in pre-revolutionary France or Britain after the Seven Years
War. Yet there was a family of Latin and French terms associated with refinement and
conduct regulated by manners.29 In the context of the debates over the Americas and the
validity of ancient texts, a forming conception of civilization was endowed with the values
of progress and exceptionality. The conceptual signage that buttressed European grasp of
Asian, African, and American societies was materializing in this long period. It was only
robust enough at this time to impart to Spanish, English, and French subjects an
ambiguous language through which Europeans could either interpret themselves as the
civilized or could refer to standards of civility in criticism of empire building.
This conceptual signage was the emergent or instituting imaginary. It provided the
horizon for an interpretive paradigm of Europe's relationships with Amerindian societies.
The expansion of Europe's imperial states was marked by a tension between their
particularities and the general confrontation between European and Amerindian civiliza-
tions. Europe's civilizational imaginary contained universalizing patterns and ideals.3o
Civilizational consciousness was forged in a dynamic of homogenization and counter-
vailing heterogeneity. The actualization of this civilizational difference-or, more properly,
consciousness of difference-is evident in four historical practices of Atlantic colonialism:
cartography, place naming, historiography and the elaboration of the image of the noble
savage. How each of these constituted signs of civilization is elaborated in more detail
below.
29 Rundell and Mennell, Classical Readings, 6-7.
30 Amason, "Social Theory and the Concept of Civilisation", 88-91.
The world was re-mapped within European consciousness as a place foreign to
Europe, but under the auspices of its major powers. Mapping cultivated this pretension.31
The development of cartography was precarious and unstable. Colonialism provided the
impulse towards common standards of cartography within imperial states. The commen-
surability of spatial representations that imperial states strove for was one impetus to
uniformity in cartography. Standard representations of the semiotics of space within
Spain's Casa de Contratacion and Portugal's Padron Real animated European conceptions
of the world as a series of imperial domains. The expansion of printing enabled a wider
distribution of maps and intensified the competition for more advanced versions. The
minimal Portolan charts ceded ground by the end of the 16th century to more elaborate
and expansive Dutch maps.32 They captured the globe in a European conception that
crossed Dutch, English, French, and Spanish experience. Imperial officials, merchants, and
explorers constructed and read maps not only for practical purposes, but also to
comprehend the extent of their national reach. Attempts to map the whole world indicate
a desire to grasp the totality of humanity and bring it under the signs of civilization.
Unknown lands and continents were accepted widely by the third quarter of the
sixteenth century. Maps flourished, carrying more detail of places colonized by European
powers reassuring imperial elites of their control. They connoted a great mobility.
Mapping and the signs made on maps in a way made the places themselves
transportable.33 Those places could be unfixed and "read" in a form that was legible.
This suited the Baroque culture of Counter-Reformation Europe as maps were designed to
impress the visual senses and could act as the accessories of imperial identity. Cartography
was an especial mode of representation that boasted the achievements of European state
formation and that deepened civilizational identity. Concurrent processes of exploration
and the cartographic charting of the non-European world were the initiation of imperial
imagery of the globe and Europe's possessions in it.
Place naming involved a more literal institution of signs. It has been argued that the
textuality of European culture was part of the colonizing process.34 If this is the case and if
it can be seen as part of a cultural movement onto the American continent then New
Spain was a front line. The Aztec world was "textually captured" over time. Initially, the
romanization of Nahuatl ensured the displacement and slow demise of pictography.3s
Mexican idiom utilized combinations of expressive forms for a period. Ultimately, the wane
of indigenous signs was an act of assimilation that was shored up by other forms of
redefinition of the pre-Hispanic imaginaire. Topography too was conceptually reordered.
In the Mexican scenario-and more generally throughout the Americas-the environ-
ment was grasped in new ways. Reconstituting places with European-like names was part
of the process of classification. The suppression of indigenous territorial signs reclassified
the unfamiliar world. Re-identification and re-naming of places left a European stamp on
31 See Biggs' compelling argument that the reconception of spatial form from the 15th century
onwards brought a new political imagination of territory in "Putting the State on the Map",
374-405.
32 See Hale, The Civilization of Europe, 15-27 and Suarez, Shedding the Veil, ch. 6 and 7.
33 Pagden, Lords of All the World, 27 -9.
34 Todorov and Greenblatt are the seminal thinkers in this line of argument. See Todorov, The
Conquest of America and Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions.
3S Gruzinski, The Conquest of Mexico, 52-5.
the land.36 Comparison of known American geographical features with the familiar
European landscape acted discursively to tame the land. Many Amerindian words were
appropriated. Also Inca and Aztec maps maintained a coexistence with Hispanic American
cartography and were absorbed in some instances. However, there are strong reasons for
recognizing that the invention of nomenclature for the new environment, as though it
were a tabula rasa, was a vital feature of colonial accommodation to the American world.
Writing and rewriting histories of the continent was a related form of fashioning of
civilizational identity. Many changes in historiography were represented in the Spanish
Atlantic.37 In the 16th century, the historiographic absorption of Aztec and Mayan sources
was more sympathetic to Amerindian perspectives than eighteenth century histories of
pre-Colombian societies would prove to be. European historiographic conventions set the
narrative structures in both cases, to be sure. Earlier accounts believed the sources to be
biased and primitive, but they regarded local information as sufficiently authoritative in
the context of an unknown past. Far more authority was conferred on graphic and oral
indigenous accounts at this time. In the face of seemingly confounding and contradictory
Amerindian histories, the initial chroniclers of the pre-Hispanic past sought to order events
in ways that were intelligible to Spaniards and Creoles. They utilized biblical references and
metaphors in rendering the past into a single linear narrative. In doing so, they devised
methods that gave voice to indigenous interlocutors.
By the eighteenth century, however, this frame of interpretation increasingly clashed
with evolutionary thinking associated with Cornelius de Pauw, Abbe Raynal, Buffon,
Voltaire, and William Robertson. A new species of history writing thoroughly doubted the
reliability of earlier eyewitnesses and questioned the capacity of indigenous script and
non-literal reports to amass and order information on past events. Historiographic validity
came to depend on a method of philosophical criticism. Historical, philological, and
scientific treatises were increasingly judged by the standards of internal consistency.
Philosopher-travelers became the new narrators. The framework of evolutionary history
was the paradigm of judgment that would override more empirical attempts to describe
difference. In Europe, it inspired relatively closed systems of thought that derided
American culture, where previous Spanish accounts of the Amerindian world drew
stereotyping but, nevertheless more flattering analogies with classical Europe.
In the Spanish Indies, this provoked a sharp reaction. A kind of Spanish-American
patriotic epistemology built up a critique of the scientific contempt for the American world
and the eyewitnesses who gave account of it. The social standing of Creole interpreters
was privileged in the defense of American historiography, where it was resolutely
maligned in European versions. Americans thought that only they could understand the
complex compendium of local sources that were the raw materials of history. In defending
their histories, they were also upholding a partisan position in continent-wide dialogues in
Europe that countered social-evolutionary philosophy. This was an epistemological battle
over the civilizational eminence of the Americas. It marked out two different basic
perceptions of the value of the peoples, societies, and ecosystems that inhabited the
Western hemisphere. In other words, by the 18th century, two different orientations
indicated a more sharply defined conception of civilizational specificity. Europeans sensed
36 Axtell, Beyond 1492, 58-63.
37 This is one of Jorge Canizares-Esguerra's principal arguments in a revision of Atlantic history.
See How to Write the History, particularly ch. 2.
alterity, while Creole Americans differentiated themselves from both Spaniards and
northern Europeans and from subaltern mestizos. This battle for cultural possession of the
past informed the accumulation of civilizational distinction in the present.
A prevailing sense of radical difference became entrenched in the historical
imagination, much as it also guided mapping and place naming. Similarly, the
comprehension of other peoples crystallized in different versions of the noble savage
motif. The image of the noble savage was more potent in France in the 18th century than
anywhere else in Europe. At that time, it designated opposites to the civilized European.
The primitive savage was one opposite or, rather, an assembly of opposites. However,
traces of the noble savage can be found in earlier representations. It did not originate in
Rousseau's romantic essays, or Lahontan's dialogues, although these did much to spread
it. It began more modestly in meetings on the frontier, letters, diaries, paintings, and
woodcuts. It also survived in the interpretations of artifacts, plants and people transported
and exhibited in Europe.38 A romantic civilizational image was sharply marked out in the
comprehension of the difference of the western continent.
The myths of savagery acquired momentum in the particular contents of separate
colonial projects. For the Spanish, in general terms, paganism anthropologically defined
the conditions of Amerindian peoples as both barbaric and noble. How it did so varied
from the early years of Spanish colonialism to its final period.39 The tension between the
two sides of the one image enlivened 16th century theological and legal debates over
their status as subjects, such as the well-known Valladolid Controversy. This was the main
theological dilemma of early Spanish colonialism: how to relate to actual peoples whose
genesis and character were unexplained. Ethnographic categories of barbarism were
deployed in reference to new races, but this was sufficiently elastic to allow the
representation of American natives as virtuous. New data on the Americas was interpreted
through the prism of classical (particularly Roman) and biblical analogies as contesting
views sought to work out where Amerindians fitted into the anthropography of humanity.
The names used in theological and historiographic disputes to describe different things in
Caribbean and Mesoamerican cultures invoked familiarity, just as the names of places did
so more generally back in the Americas.
Moreover, the signifiers allowed recognition of the internal hierarchies of highland
Mesoamerican societies. They constituted a recognizable vocabulary that could partly
depict social complexity. Eighteenth century works in the evolutionary philosophy of
history disparaged such aids to recognition. The Spanish had earlier conceptualized
savagery in un-philosophical terms, according to this view. Too much nobility was
accorded to the pre-civil conditions of Mesoamerican cultures and their place in the
ranking of civilizations could not be accurately reflected. Of course, the level of
differentiation was no longer immediately evident to eighteenth century observers, as
the long process of integration of Amerindian communities had simplified previous
hierarchies. The writings of ascendant evolutionary historiography reflected indigenes as
an amorphous mass of commoners lacking the societal complexity of civilized peoples.
This censure of the Amerindian world had an impact on later Spanish images of savagery,
subjecting them to an assault on suggestions that virtue and civility could inhere in
indigenous cultures. Spanish responses were tempered by the need to defend its history
38 Whitaker, "The Culture of Curiosity", 75-90.
39 Canizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History, 38-44, 207.
of colonialism against the Protestant offensive and by the Bourbon project of moderniza-
tion. Overall, they proved unsuccessful. Along the way, the ambivalence about indigenous
civilizations waned.
Seventeenth century English perceptions of savagery rested on different values.40
The indigenous proto-federations of North America did not have the signs of
industriousness that were at the core of the Protestant temperament and capitalist ideal.
English colonists built an empire of fences in the North Americas with this ideal in mind.
Agrarian and village traditions melded with different inflections of Protestantism to
reorganize the landscape according to the principles of enclosure. The legality and
legitimacy of possession came only with delineation of possession and "improvement" of
land. The indigenous mode of production, quite deliberate in its land use, was not
recognized as civilized at all. Native American hierarchies were identified, but were not
respected because of the value accorded private property.
The English shared general colonial values, but views of their relations with the
Indian nations could still vary. The contrast is consistent, however, with emerging noble/
ignoble images. Later, the French would sharpen the vision of noble savagery. They
combined romantic reconstruction of the simplicity of native society with exuberance for
the progress that civilization allegedly brought. In either English or French versions, the
indigenes appeared uncultured. Savagery, in French eyes, came from a condition of
proximity to Nature.41 The lack of polished manners, the competences of conversation and
the arts was an indigenous trait that set them outside of the bounds of civility. Unlike the
Spanish, French writers thought the indigenes capable of civilized development, but that
they simply did not possess its rudiments.
Ideas about America's pre-Columbian peoples were shared and widely commu-
nicated. In the romantic impulse of the 18th century, the image of the noble savage
started to lose its national specificity. The transfiguration of American identity blended
also mestizo, Creole and slave, although pre-Colombian peoples were reserved a special
place. This was a new peak in transatlantic civilizational consciousness and the image of
the American noble savage-a figure saturated with European ambiguities-acquired its
most mythical features.
A deeper awareness of Western Europe's relative position in the world was evident
by the eighteenth century. The word "civilization" itself was only barely in use. However,
the widespread consciousness that circumscribed its expression had formed out of the
civilizational imaginary. The self-consciousness of Europeans caught up in the civilizing
process, as Elias describes it, was forged not only in connection with the territorial
consolidation of the state, but also in the civilizational intersection with the Americas. The
civilizing process developed not only in the social settings of court society, but also out of
the transatlantic exchange of images and impressions of America. The barbaric outsiders,
who were the necessary opposite of the courtly ethos of self-restraint, were not just
Muslims or commoners. They were also indigenous Americans, mestizos and slaves.
The European civilization that was incarnated in this consciousness combined
ethnographic curiosity and different modes of representation. Three centuries of uneven
colonial engagement with Amerindian civilizations resulted in the uneven absorption of
the newfound hemisphere into Europe's cultural dominion. The American colonies were
40 Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession, ch. 1.
41 See Dickason, The Myth of Savage, especially 63 -70.
an alternative point of reference in a civilizational consciousness defined by its interpretive
paradigms. Colonial America seemed to contain so many cultural opposites, interpreta-
tions of which invigorated Europeans' sense of civilizational singularity. This New World
was a presence and a horizon that helped to define the civilizational identity of Western
Europe in the early modern era long before the word "civilization" acquired a currency of
usage and before its entries in modern dictionaries and encyclopaedia.
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